

## Cybersecurity Cost Issues Facing Today's Cost Analyst

#### GALORATH

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Three Key National Security Initiatives Space Dominance Data Analytics/Data Science

Cybersecurity

- Army now says Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and
- Reconnaissance Center (C5ISR)
- Cloud Fog Mist Computing/Costing expands the challenge
- As the Vinn Diagram shows, Cyber is critical to all three areas








## A Cybersecurity Example

#### 100'X100' Secure Facility with in-house and cloud applications

APEX Inc is a COCO developing software and integrating it into chips for a classified DoD communications project.



**ISSUE 1**: How broad is the definition? Does it include (**Cyber-Physical Systems**):

- Building the SCIF, providing perimeter protection, remote monitoring, access control, ...?
- Protecting access to the Program Control System (PCS) as well...HVAC, power source, monitoring system etc.?
- Does it include cloud security?
- More than internal network control/monitoring?
- The O&S/sustainment tail
- Disaster recovery plan, Live recovery, Contingency plan, Best practices for recovery
  ISSUE 2: Where are the data?

The Big Question: How much should APEX send/the DoD allocate for Cybersecurity?



# Source is RS Means 2020

- SCIF space (PAX Newsletter 2020 FAC Code 14162), for a CONUS site, costs \$564/SF based on 4,100 SF average size (FY19\$).
- A typical Visitor Control Center is \$408/SF (FY19\$) based on a 2,960 SF space.
- A Gatehouse averaging 933 SF is \$731/SF (FY19\$).
- Camera & monitor are \$1,325 with an adder of \$2,300 for pan tilt zoom for a total of \$4,625 (FY19\$)
- If this is a stand-alone facility you would also want to consider security fencing & AT/FP measures such as bollards.
- If you needed fencing it would be \$44.50/LF for an 8' high security/retention fence (PAX Newsletter 2020 FAC Code 87210)
- Bollards would run \$1,351 per (PAX Newsletter 2020 FAC Code 88040)



CYBERSECURITY ADVICE FROM THE BEST HACKERS IN THE WORLD

### TRIBE <sup>©™</sup>HACKERS

WILEY

The Biggest Myth

"The biggest myth is that we are one technical solution away from solving all of the industry's problems."

"Perhaps I'm just jaded by all the marketing, but I think the biggest myth in security is that risk can be reduced, and security posture can be improved, by purchasing products."

"It's not always the hacker in the black hoodie trying to steal your data, and it's not always about someone trying to steal your personal information, credit card numbers, or secrets. Sometimes, it's the teammate who is still getting their feet wet—but has administrative access to all your systems—who accidentally took down or deleted an entire piece of your infrastructure."



#### CYBERSECURITY ADVICE FROM THE BEST HACKERS IN THE WORLD

CKERS

WILEY

### Recommended Reading

nal Cost Estimating & Analysis Association - www.iceaaonline.com

# The Biggest Myth Continued

"I would say that the biggest myth about cybersecurity is that spending more money makes you more secure. Many companies are willing to spend their money on expensive products when they should focus their efforts on hiring educated and talented employees."

"The most recurring myth I encounter is that security isn't everyone's problem. The reality is that using secure and privacy-enabling technology isn't just beneficial for yourself, but it is, in practice, an act of solidarity."

Bottom Line: Cybersecurity is not hard it is a marathon



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Data


Availability

### Cybersecurity

- Cyber Security means different things to different sets of people, e.g.
  - personal,
  - small business,
  - large business,
  - national security, ...
- Information security performs four important functions for an organization:
  - Protecting the organization's ability to function
  - Protecting the data and information the organization collects and uses
  - Enabling the safe operation of applications running on the organization's IT systems
  - Safeguarding the organization's technology assets
- Includes
  - Physical security/Infrastructure
  - Local Hosts
  - Local Networks
  - Perimeter

A Life Cycle Cost Estimate should address all costs; Protection, Detection, and Response

### **Correlation Between Attacks and User\***




- Information systems now are so complicated that U.S. companies need more than 200 days, on average, just to detect a breach.
- On average 75% of attacks are External and 25% Internal.
- With more "remote" work, there will be more vulnerability

\*Diogenes, Yuri. Cybersecurity – Attack and Defense Strategies: Counter modern threats and employ state-of-the-art tools and techniques to protect your organization against cybercriminals, 2nd Edition . Packt Publishing. Kindle Edition.

### **CYBER Kill Chain & Threat Actors**





Your security posture won't be fully completed if you don't have a good detection system; this means having the right sensors distributed across the network, monitoring the activities.

Diogenes, Yuri. Cybersecurity – Attack and Defense Strategies: Counter modern threats and employ state-of-the-art tools and techniques to protect your organization against cybercriminals, 2nd Edition



Every cyber decision hinges upon two questions: Will it work, and is it affordable



Some threats are easier to cost than others It is not just about hardware/software solutions Some suggest the cost of protection is greater than the cost to develop a threat



### Real World Case of Ransomware

WannaCry

6	Wana Decrypt0r 2.0		×					
	Ooops, your files have been encrypted!	English	~					
1	What Happened to My Computer? Your important files are encrypted. Many of your documents, photos, videos, databases and other files are no longer accessible because they have been encrypted. Maybe you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but do not waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.							
Payment will be raised on	Car I Danama Mar Fila-2							
5/16/2017 00:47:55	Can I Recover My Files? Sure. We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. But you have not so enough time.							
Time Left	You can decrypt some of your files for free. Try now by clicking <decry< th=""><th>ypt&gt;.</th><th></th></decry<>	ypt>.						
02:23:57:37	32# 23# 577# 37 You only have 3 days to submit the payment. After that the price will be doubled. Also, if you don't pay in 7 days, you won't be able to recover your files forever. We will have free events for users who are so poor that they couldn't pay in 6 month							
Your files will be lost on		uy in e menuis.						
5/20/2017 00:47:55	How Do I Pay? Payment is accepted in Bitcoin only. For more information, click <abou< th=""><th>at hitcoin&gt;.</th><th></th></abou<>	at hitcoin>.						
Time Left	Please check the current price of Bitcoin and buy some bitcoins. For me click <how bitcoins="" buy="" to="">.</how>		k -					
06:23:57:37	And send the correct amount to the address specified in this window. After your payment, click <check payment="">. Best time to check: 9:00am - 11:00am</check>							
About bitcoin	Send \$300 worth of bitcoin to this address							
How to buy bitcoins?	ACCEPTED HERE 12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMv	°	opy					
Contact Us	Check Payment Decr	ypt						

At this point, the incident response team was working on three different fronts: one to try to break the ransomware encryption, another to try to identify other systems that were vulnerable to this type of attack, and another one working to communicate the issue to the press.

Diogenes, Yuri. Cybersecurity – Attack and Defense Strategies: Counter modern threats and employ state-of-the-art tools and techniques to protect your organization against cybercriminals, 2nd Edition . Packt Publishing. Kindle Edition.




### Approaches To Cybersecurity Cost Analysis

- Economic/Cost Benefit Model excellent for some business decisions – however, some benefits (life, safety, security) are difficult to quantify
- Bottoms-Up/Engineering Build Up Model great way to effectively cost what is defined – however, we face the classic "know, unknown, and unknown-unknown issue"\*
- Top-Down/Parametric Model based on statistically valid cause and effect relationships – however, data is the key

\*In a news briefing in February 2002, the United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, responded to a question with a phrase that continues to be used even today by the intelligence community. He said: "As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know."

#### Cybersecurity Costing Includes Infrastructure, People, Software, Hardware, IT & Policy, and Threat Life Cycle Management



Above costs don't include cost impact of breaches



### The O&S/TOC/Sustainment of Cybersecurity

Sometimes we think of Cybersecurity as the defensive posture only, rather than considering the total life cycle

### Threat Life Cycle Management





### MITRE ATTCK FRAMEWORK

	Execution 31 items	Persistence 56 items	Privilege Escalation 28 items	Defense Evasion 59 items	Credential Access 20 items	Discovery 19 items	Lateral Movement	Collection 13 items	Exflitration 9 items	Command And Control 21 items
xploit Public-Facing	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Manipulation	Binary Padding	Bash History	Application Window	Application Deployment	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through
Application	Command-Line Interface	AppCert DLLs	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Brute Force	Discovery	Software	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Removable Media
fardware Additions	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	AppCert DLLs	Bypass User Account Control		Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Data from Information	Data Transfer Size	Connection Proxy
Replication Through Removable Media	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	AppInit DLLs	Clear Command History		File and Directory	Exploitation of Remote	Repositories	Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol
	Execution through API	Authentication Package	Application Shimming	CM		Pair and Directory	Services	Data from Local	Exfiltration Over	
ipearphishing ttachment	Execution through Module	BITS Jobs	Bypass User Account	Col		e	Logon Scripts	System	Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol
pearphishing Link	Load	Bootkit	Control				Pass the Hash	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Command and Control	Data Encoding
pearphishing via	Exploitation for Client	Browser Extensions	DLL Search Order Hijacking				Pass the Ticket	Data from Removable	Channel	Data Obfuscation
Service	Execution	Change Default File	Dylib Hijacking		ITR		Remote Desktop	Media	Exfiltration Over Other	Domain Fronting
Supply Chain	Graphical User Interface	Association	Exploitation for	Co			Protocol	Data Staged	Network Medium	Fallback Channels
Compromise	InstallUtil	Component Firmware	Privilege Escalation	DC		16	Remote File Copy	Email Collection	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Multi-hop Proxy
rusted Relationship	Launcheti	Component Object Model	Extra Window Memory				Remote Services	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Multi-Stage Channels
LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rundll32 Scheduled Task Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Pro Execution Signed Script Pro Execution Source	Local Job Scheduling	Hijacking	Injection	tol:		ips in the second	Replication Through	Man in the Browser		Multiband Communication
	LSASS Driver	Create Account	File System Permissions Weakness		F0.		Removable Media	Screen Capture		
	Mshta	DLL Search Order	Hooking		dversarial Tactics, Technic & Common Knowledge	iques	Shared Webroot	Video Capture		Multilayer Encryption
	PowerShell	Hijacking	Image File Execution	DLI			SSH Hijacking			Port Knocking
	Regsvcs/Regasm	Dylib Hijacking	Options Injection	Exc Adversarial			Taint Shared Content			Remote Access Tools
	Regsvr32	External Remote Services	Launch Daemon	Ext & Comr			Third-party Software			Remote File Copy
	Rundli32 File System Permissions Weakness	New Service	File		No.	Windows Admin Shares	5		Standard Application Layer Protocol	
		Path Interception	File System Logical Umiets		System intormation	Windows Remote			Standard Cryptographic	
	Scripting	Directories	Plist Modification	Gatekeeper Bypass		Discovery	Management			Protocol
	Service Execution	Hooking	Port Monitors	Hidden Files and Directories	Two-Factor Authentication	System Network Configuration Discovery				Standard Non-Application
	Execution Imag Signed Script Proxy Opti Execution Kerr	Hypervisor	Process Injection	Hidden Users	Interception	System Network Connections Discovery				Layer Protocol
		Imana Ella Europidian	Scheduled Task	Hidden Window						Uncommonly Used Port
		Options Injection Kernel Modules and Extensions	Service Registry	HISTCONTROL		System Owner/User Discovery System Service				Web Service
			Permissions Weakness	Image File Execution Options						
		and the second	Setuid and Setgid	Injection						
	Space after Filename	ce after Filename Launch Agent	and the second sec	· · · · · ·		Discovery				



### Today Cybersecurity Costs are being assessed in two primary ways:

- Traditional WBS Build Up "Bottom Up" engineering build up – Galorath is building a database/repository of Cybersecurity items and implementing solutions in SEER
- Cost Risk/NPV Economic Value Assessment – cost per breach

We are missing a "Top Down/Parametric" approach to Cybersecurity Cost Analysis








### **Economic/Cost Benefit Model**

#### Key Economic Measures

- Net Present Value
- Internal Rate of Return
- Return On Investment

One key finding from the Gordon and Lobe model is: "The amount a firm should spend to protect information is generally no more that one-third or so (37%)of projected loss from a breach. Above that level, in most cases, each dollar spent will reduce the anticipated loss by less than a dollar."

There are some hard decisions, e.g. What is yo*ur* reputation worth?






### Conceptual "Parametric" Cyber Cost Analysis Model

- Generic COCOMO Approach E=ai(KLoC)(bi)(EAF)
  - where E is the effort applied in person-months, KLoC is the estimated number of thousands of delivered lines of code for the project, and EAF is the factor calculated above.
- Simply described\*
  - Size (Measured as LOC, FP, SP, ...) is run through a set of environmental factor to produce an effort and the effort is distributed over time using a statistical distribution
  - Could we apply this conceptual approach to developing a Cyber Model?\*\*
- A CO"CYBER"MO
- \* With deep apologies to all COCOMO/Software cost experts

\*\* With recognition that USC is already proposing a common criteria evaluation assurance levels (CC EAL) model




### Cybersecurity Variables

- Sectors National Security, Commercial, Other Federal (these sectors will expand as we collect data)
- Threat Actors Nation States, Competitors, Criminals, Hacktivists, Opportunists, and Insiders (will this set of threats change/grow)
- Cyber Mitigations/Evaluations Physical Security, Network Security, Education, Malware, Removable media, Secure config, User privileges, Monitoring, and Remote Working



# The Hypothetical "SECURE" Cyber Cost Model (Sector Evaluated Cyber Utility Risk Estimate)




3. Federal (Other)

\* Multiple Sectors could be evaluated at the same time; e.g. a commercial company developing a National Security product

\* \*need Data Collection

### An Alternative Cost Model

 During an ISBGS presentation they proposed a function point approach



In either case we need to identify cost drivers and then collect and analyze data



### THE SEER SUITE

Predictive Analytics for Various Domains

