

NORTHROP GRUMMAN



Risk-Based Return On Sales (ROS) for Proposals with Mitigating Terms and Conditions

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
R.L. Coleman, E.R. Druker, B.L. Cullis, C.M. Kanick,
A.V. Bapat, J.M. Callahan, B.P. Caccavale

The Problem

- “Tell me the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentile of Cost, and the ROS at the 80th.”
- Risk tool provides these numbers without real insight into the *distribution* of ROS
- On a complex FPI contract with mitigating terms and conditions (Ts & Cs), the one-to-one correspondence of (“on-the-shareline”) cost and ROS was destroyed
 - “Eureka!” graph on next slide
 - It became evident that what we really wanted was the 20th percentile of ROS
 - Explaining this to decision-makers was a challenge
 - Developing a “scenario” that produced both the 20th percentile ROS *and* the 80th percentile cost was a challenge
 - Oh, and the situation was complicated by split buy and at-cost vs. equitable adjustments!
- The solution: Develop analytical and empirical tools for determining the distribution of ROS

Cost vs. ROS

Variation in ROS



Outline

- Contract Types Overview
 - Contract Types are just functions that map Cost to Profit, Price, and ROS
 - Reviewing the conventional wisdom on contract types and risk
- Contract Types and Risk
 - Looking at your range of possible outcomes across the shareline
- Risk-Based ROS
 - Percentiles vs. Mean and the distribution of ROS
- Distribution of ROS (analytical, without Ts & Cs)
 - Transformation of random variables
- Distribution of ROS (empirical, without Ts & Cs)
 - Monte Carlo cross-check
- Distribution of ROS with Ts & Cs
- Closing Thoughts

Contract Types Overview

- **Fixed-Price**

ROS
could be
negative!

- Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) [FAR 16.202]
- Fixed-Price Incentive (FPI) [FAR 16.204]

Incentive contracts
[FAR 16.4]

- **Cost-Reimbursement [FAR 16.3]**

ROS
strictly
positive

- Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) [FAR 16.304]
- Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) [FAR 16.305]
- Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) [FAR 16.306]

- Contract Types vary according to

- Degree and timing of the responsibility assumed by the contractor for the costs
- **Amount and nature of the profit incentive** offered to the contractor for achieving or exceeding specified standards or goals

- We'll omit CPAF because it is by definition subjective

Contract Types Conventional Wisdom

- Cost-Reimbursement contracts are high risk to the government
 - But what about Good Will Risk?! (LPD 17)
- Fixed-Price contracts are high risk to the contractor
 - But what about Over-the-Barrel Risk?!
 - Manifests as Default or Cancellation (A-12)
 - But what about Economic Price Adjustment (EPA)?!
 - We'll come back to that...
 - But also high opportunity!
- FFP is cheaper for the government
 - But the contractor will price in risk!



High
(Cost) Risk
Low

Contractor Risk = Contractor Incentive to Control Costs
Government Risk

Beware Over-the-Barrel Risk!

Beware Good Will Risk!

Typical continuum

FFP FPIF CPIF CPAF CPFF

Contract Types

Cost Estimating Body of Knowledge (CEBoK), Module 14 Contract Pricing, SCEA, 2009.

Fee, Profit, and Margin

- Fee = Profit = Return On Cost (ROC): Amount of money earned by contractor over and above Cost, *expressed as a percentage of Cost*
 - Fee technical only applies to Cost-type contracts
 - We will use Fee and Profit interchangeably
 - In particular, TF = Target Fee/Profit, to distinguish from TP = Target Price
- Margin = Return On Sales (ROS): Profit *expressed as a percentage of Revenue* (= Cost + Profit = Price)

Tip: This is a “percent-centric” slide; these three quantities can also be reported in dollars (\$).

Warning: The error is in denominator!



$$\text{Fee} = \text{Profit} = \$1\text{M} / \$10\text{M} = 10.0\%$$

$$\text{Margin} = \$1\text{M} / \$11\text{M} = 9.1\%$$

$$\text{Margin} = \text{Fee} / (1 + \text{Fee})$$


$$\text{Fee} = \text{Margin} / (1 - \text{Margin})$$

Remember this formula!

Contract Types with Andy Rooney

“You know what really bugs me...?!”

- Contracts people are English majors, Cost people are Math majors
 - FAR = blah, blah, blah – just give me a piecewise linear function!
 - Contract Data Elements specify outputs (Min Fee, Max Fee, Ceiling Price), we want inputs (RIE endpoints, PTA)
- Contract Types are just functions that map Cost to Profit, Price, and ROS...
 - ...as you depart from Target Cost
 - If you come in at Target Cost, contract type is immaterial
 - Of course, you *never* come in at Target Cost (no estimate is ever right)
- Incentive contracts is a misnomer [FAR 16.4]
 - *All* contracts provide an ROS incentive, just a matter of degree
 - Only contract type that would incentivize overruns is cost plus fixed *percent* fee, which is specifically prohibited [FAR 16.102(c)]
 - If you don't think contractors are motivated by ROS, you're crazy!
- Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) ain't fixed! [FAR 16.403]
 - What part of “price adjustment formula” did you not understand?!
 - Contractors are given extreme risk (past PTA), but not commensurate extreme opportunity



Toy Problem

• Typical Set of Inputs

- Target Cost (TC) = \$10.0M
Target Profit (Fee) (TF) = \$1.0M
Target Price (TP) = \$11.0M [all]
- 10% Profit (ROC)
9.1% Margin (ROS) [all]
- 70/30 Over-Target Shareline
40/60 Under-Target Shareline [CPIF/FPI]
- Min Fee (mF) = 3%, Max Fee (MF) = 20% [CPIF]
- Ceiling Price (CP) = 130% [FPI]

$$RIE_{low} = TC - \frac{(MF - TF)}{CS_{under}}$$

$$RIE_{high} = TC + \frac{(TF - mF)}{CS_{over}}$$

$$PTA = TC + \frac{(CP - TP)}{GS_{over}}$$


Target Cost	\$ 10.0		
Target Profit	\$ 1.0	10.0%	Profit Percent
Target Price	\$ 11.0	9.1%	Margin Percent
Min Fee	\$ 0.3	3.0%	Min Fee Percent
Max Fee	\$ 2.0	20.0%	Max Fee Percent
Under Gov Share	40%		
Under Cont Share	60%		
Over Gov Share	70%		
Over Cont Share	30%		
PTA	\$ 12.9		
Ceiling Price	\$ 13.0	130.0%	Ceiling Price Percent
RIE Low	\$ 8.3		
RIE High	\$ 12.3		

yellow fill = input
blue fill = calculated

Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP)

Contract Data Elements:
TP = FFP

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Tip: All contract types yield the same Profit (\$1M) and Price (\$11M) at the Target Cost (\$10M)


Fixed Price = \$11M

Essentially a 0/100 shareline!

ROS goes negative when Cost exceeds FFP

Fixed-Price Incentive (FPI)

Contract Data Elements:
 TC, TP, Sharelines,
 Ceiling Price




Cost Estimating Body of Knowledge (CEBoK), Module 14 Contract Pricing, SCEA, 2009.

Cost-Plus-Incentive Fee (CPIF)

Contract Data Elements:
 TC, TF, Sharelines,
 Min/Max Fee



CPIF




Cost Estimating Body of Knowledge (CEBoK), Module 14 Contract Pricing, SCEA, 2009.

Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF)

Contract Data Elements:
TC, FF = TF

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


Cost Estimating Body of Knowledge (CEBoK), Module 14 Contract Pricing, SCEA, 2009.

Contract Types Comparison – Profit (Y)

- Note that CPIF and FPI “go parallel” to CPFF and FFP, respectively


Profit Compare



Contract Types Comparison – Price (X+Y)

Price Comparison


Note that CPIF and FPI “go parallel” to CPFF and FFP, respectively



Contract Types Comparison – ROS (Y/(X+Y))




ROS Compare



Contract Types and Risk


- We wish to examine the interplay of risk and uncertainty with contract geometry for the various contract types
 - In view of conventional wisdom
 - Looking at “range of possible outcomes across the shareline”
- Imagine a bell curve and/or S-curve of cost (assume normal) superimposed on the ROS function
 - If you, like the author, have no imagination, we’ll show it to you shortly!
- What happens when...
 - Estimate is aggressive?
 - Competitive (full-and-open) or negotiation (sole-source) pressure on Target Cost
 - Compensate by adding one standard deviation to Target Cost as risk
 - Estimate is padded?
 - Does this still happen?
 - Compensate by subtracting one standard deviation from Target Cost as opportunity
 - Variation is understated?
 - Cost Estimating Variability or risks/opportunities omitted
 - Compensate by doubling coefficient of variation (CV)
- We would like to observe the effect on the mean and key percentiles (20/50/80) of ROS
 - To do this, we need a method to determine the distribution of ROS (the main event)
 - In fact, we have two!

S-Curves – The Shaping Forces



These generalities hold true in most cases but given certain conditions may not hold exactly as written


S-Curves – The Shaping Forces



These generalities hold true in most cases but given certain conditions may not hold exactly as written

Distribution of Cost and Functions of Cost

CPFF



Risk-Based ROS

- It's the ROS, stupid!
 - Return On Sales (ROS) is single biggest motivating metric for contractors
- Bid ROS is a meaningless number
 - Like To-complete Cost Performance Index (TCPI) in EVM
- Percentiles (20/50/80) of ROS helpful for decision-making
 - Especially 80th for risk averse
- Mean ROS is best single metric for portfolio expectations
 - Ideally should be considered in conjunction with Cost for proper dollar-weighting
- We really want *distribution* of ROS
 - Enables us to calculate percentiles, means, and other statistics
 - Requires additional computational steps, but...
- The good news is:
 - No additional cost risk analysis is required
 - "Monte's never busy"

Warning: Math Ahead!

- Why do the analytical method at all, when we can just Monte Carlo?
- Analytical method gives insight into “what is really going on”
 - Improved understanding by the analyst will help ensure proper use of automated tools
- Analytical method enables faster what-if analysis
 - Don’t have to re-run the Monte Carlo every time you change parameters
- Analytical method is valuable cross-check for Monte Carlo
 - Caught input errors on two out of four Monte Carlo runs
 - Inadvertent reversal of Government/Contractor Share
 - Confusion between % and \$ for Min and Max Fee
- It’s like the joke about the dog...
 - Because we can!

Distribution of ROS (Analytical)


- Without Ts and Cs
- Transformation of random variables!
 - We math nerds always get excited about real-world applications of something we learned in school and thought we'd never use again!
- Define random variables:
 - $X = \text{Cost}$
 - $Y = \text{Profit (Fee)} = f(X)$, where f is determined by contract type
 - Bright green line from earlier contract type graphs
 - Piecewise linear function for all major contract types (FFP/FPI/CPIF/CPFF)
 - Monotonically non-increasing function of Cost
 - In fact, monotonically decreasing except for CPFF
 - $X+Y = \text{Price}$
 - Monotonically non-decreasing function of Cost
 - In fact, monotonically increasing except for FFP
 - $Z = \text{ROS} = Y/(X+Y) = 1 - X/(X+Y)$
 - Monotonically decreasing function of Cost (for *all* contract types)

Distributions of Profit, Price, and ROS are continuous but not smooth at “break points”

Distribution of ROS – Geometric Interpretation



CPFF



Distribution of ROS – The “Easy Way”

- Using the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) and logic (outlined on the Eggspectation kiddie placemat in crayon!)

$$F_Z(z) = P(Z \leq z) = P\left(\frac{Y}{X+Y} \leq z\right) = P\left(1 - \frac{X}{X+f(x)} \leq z\right) =$$

$$P\left(1 - z \leq \frac{X}{X+f(X)}\right) = P\left(X + f(X) \leq \frac{X}{1-z}\right) = P\left(f(X) \leq X \frac{z}{1-z}\right) =$$

$$P(X \geq g(z)) = 1 - P(X \leq g(z)) = 1 - F_X(g(z))$$

- The formula for $g(z)$ depends on $f(X)$ and hence contract type
 - Since $f(X)$ is piecewise linear, there's always a simple solution
 - We'll enumerate the solutions for the four basic contract types
- The outlined step has interesting conceptual and geometric interpretations
 - Probability that Profit is less than profit percentage times cost! [slap forehead]
 - As z goes from 0 to 1, the line $y = \frac{z}{(1-z)}x$ traces out 90 degrees, starting from the x-axis and rotating counterclockwise to the y-axis
 - Intersects the decreasing Profit function further and further to the left
 - Hence captures a bigger and bigger chunk of the right part of the PDF of cost!

Distribution of ROS – The “Hard Way”

- Using the Probability Density Function (PDF) and Jacobians (!)
- Agrees with PDF derived from CDF from the “Easy Way”
 - Applying Chain Rule from calculus!

$$p_Z(z) = \frac{d}{dz} F_Z(z) = -F_X'(g(z)) \cdot g'(z) = -p_X(g(z)) \cdot g'(z)$$

Distribution of Cost

- Top-level cost distribution is usually modeled as Normal or Lognormal
 - Assume Normal with mean μ and standard deviation σ
 - Use $p(x)$ for PDF and $F(x)$ for CDF
 - X subscript to distinguish from Z subscript later for ROS distribution

$$X \sim N(\mu, \sigma)$$

$$F_X(x) = \int_{-\infty}^x p_X(t) dt = \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^x e^{-\frac{(t-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}} dt = \Phi\left(\frac{x-\mu}{\sigma}\right)$$

Distribution of ROS – CPFF (The “Easy” Case)

- Fixed Fee amount = TF
 - Linear (constant) function

$$Y = f(x) = TF$$

$$Z = \frac{TF}{TF + X}$$

$$P\left(TF \leq \left(\frac{z}{1-z}\right)X\right) = P\left(X \geq \left(\frac{1-z}{z}\right)TF\right) = 1 - P\left(X \leq \left(\frac{1-z}{z}\right)TF\right)$$

$$F_Z(z) = 1 - F_X\left(\left(\frac{1-z}{z}\right)TF\right)$$




Take
derivative,
apply chain
rule

$$p_Z(z) = \frac{TF}{z^2} p_X\left(\left(\frac{1-z}{z}\right)TF\right)$$

Distribution of ROS – CFFF (Toy Problem)



- Percentiles (20/50/80) and mean are shown on graph
 - Skew right: Mode < Median < Mean



Distribution of ROS – FFP (Even Easier!)

- FFP = Target Price = Target Cost + Target Profit
- Profit = FFP – Cost
- Linear function (slope of -1)

$$Y = f(x) = TP - X$$

$$Z = \frac{TP - X}{TP}$$

$$P\left(TP - X \leq X \frac{z}{1-z}\right) = P(X \geq TP(1-z)) = 1 - P(X \leq TP(1-z))$$

Linear Combinations
property: X is Normal
implies Z is Normal

$$F_Z(z) = 1 - F_X(TP(1-z))$$




$$p_Z(z) = TP \cdot p_X(TP(1-z))$$

Take
derivative,
apply chain
rule

Distribution of ROS – FFP (Toy Problem)

- Percentiles (20/50/80) and mean are shown on graph
 - Symmetric: Mode = Median = Mean



Incentive Formula – FPI

- Over-Target Shareline Adjustment until Point of Total Assumption (PTA)
 - Converts to FFP
- Under-Target Shareline Adjustment
- Piecewise linear function (three regimes)

$$Y = f(X) = \begin{cases} TF + CS_{under} (TC - X) & X \leq TC \\ TF - CS_{over} (X - TC) & TC < X \leq PTA \\ CP - X & X > PTA \end{cases}$$

$$X = TC \Leftrightarrow Z = \frac{TF}{TP}$$

$$X = PTA \Leftrightarrow Z = \frac{CP - PTA}{CP}$$

Distribution of ROS – FPI

$$P\left(\left(TF + CS_{under}(TC - X)\right) \leq \left(\frac{z}{1-z}\right)X\right) = 1 - P\left(X \leq \frac{(TF + CS_{under}TC)(1-z)}{CS_{under} + GS_{under}z}\right)$$


$$P\left(\left(TF - CS_{over}(X - TC)\right) \leq \left(\frac{z}{1-z}\right)X\right) = 1 - P\left(X \leq \frac{(TF + CS_{over}TC)(1-z)}{CS_{over} + GS_{over}z}\right)$$

$$P\left(CP - X \leq \left(\frac{z}{1-z}\right)X\right) = 1 - P(X \leq (1-z)CP)$$

$$F_Z(z) = \begin{cases} 1 - F_X\left(\frac{(TF + CS_{under}TC)(1-z)}{CS_{under} + GS_{under}z}\right) & z \geq \frac{TF}{TP} \\ 1 - F_X\left(\frac{(TF + CS_{over}TC)(1-z)}{CS_{over} + GS_{over}z}\right) & \frac{CP - PTA}{CP} \leq z < \frac{TF}{TP} \\ 1 - F_X((1-z)CP) & z < \frac{CP - PTA}{CP} \end{cases}$$

Distribution of ROS – FPI


Take
derivative,
apply chain
rule



$$p_Z(z) = \begin{cases} \left(\frac{TF + CS_{under}TC}{(CS_{under} + GS_{under}z)^2} \right) p_X \left(\frac{(TF + CS_{under}TC)(1-z)}{CS_{under} + GS_{under}z} \right) & z \geq \frac{TF}{TP} \\ \left(\frac{TF + CS_{over}TC}{(CS_{over} + GS_{over}z)^2} \right) p_X \left(\frac{(TF + CS_{over}TC)(1-z)}{CS_{over} + GS_{over}z} \right) & \frac{CP - PTA}{CP} \leq z < \frac{TF}{TP} \\ CP \cdot p_X((1-z)CP) & z < \frac{CP - PTA}{CP} \end{cases}$$

Distribution of ROS – FPI (Toy Problem)

- Percentiles (20/50/80) and mean are shown on graph
 - Skew right: Mode < Median < Mean



Incentive Formula – CPIF

- Over-Target Shareline Adjustment down to Min Fee
 - Converts to CPFF
- Under-Target Shareline Adjustment up to Max Fee
 - Converts to CPFF
- Piecewise linear function (four regimes)

$$Y = f(X) = \begin{cases} MF & X \leq RIE_{low} \\ TF + CS_{under}(TC - X) & RIE_{low} < X \leq TC \\ TF - CS_{over}(X - TC) & TC < X \leq RIE_{high} \\ mF & X > RIE_{high} \end{cases}$$

$$X = RIE_{low} \Leftrightarrow Z = \frac{MF}{RIE_{low} + MF}$$

$$X = TC \Leftrightarrow Z = \frac{TF}{TP}$$

$$X = RIE_{high} \Leftrightarrow Z = \frac{mF}{RIE_{high} + mF}$$

Distribution of ROS – CPIF

$$P\left(MF \leq \left(\frac{z}{1-z}\right)X\right) = 1 - P\left(X \leq \left(\frac{1-z}{z}\right)MF\right)$$

$$P\left(mF \leq \left(\frac{z}{1-z}\right)X\right) = 1 - P\left(X \leq \left(\frac{1-z}{z}\right)mF\right)$$

$$P\left((TF + CS_{under}(TC - X)) \leq \left(\frac{z}{1-z}\right)X\right) = 1 - P\left(X \leq \frac{(TF + CS_{under}TC)(1-z)}{CS_{under} + GS_{under}z}\right)$$

$$P\left((TF - CS_{over}(X - TC)) \leq \left(\frac{z}{1-z}\right)X\right) = 1 - P\left(X \leq \frac{(TF + CS_{over}TC)(1-z)}{CS_{over} + GS_{over}z}\right)$$

$$F_Z(z) = \begin{cases} 1 - F_X\left(\left(\frac{1-z}{z}\right)MF\right) & z \geq \frac{MF}{RIE_{low} + MF} \\ 1 - F_X\left(\frac{(TF + CS_{under}TC)(1-z)}{CS_{under} + GS_{under}z}\right) & \frac{TF}{TP} \leq z < \frac{MF}{RIE_{low} + MF} \\ 1 - F_X\left(\frac{(TF + CS_{over}TC)(1-z)}{CS_{over} + GS_{over}z}\right) & \frac{mF}{RIE_{high} + mF} \leq z < \frac{TF}{TP} \\ 1 - F_X\left(\left(\frac{1-z}{z}\right)mF\right) & z < \frac{mF}{RIE_{high} + mF} \end{cases}$$

Distribution of ROS – CPIF




Take
derivative,
apply chain
rule

$$p_z(z) = \begin{cases} \frac{MF}{z^2} p_X \left(\left(\frac{1-z}{z} \right) MF \right) & z \geq \frac{MF}{RIE_{low} + MF} \\ \left(\frac{TF + CS_{under} TC}{(CS_{under} + GS_{under} z)^2} \right) p_X \left(\frac{(TF + CS_{under} TC)(1-z)}{CS_{under} + GS_{under} z} \right) & \frac{TF}{TP} \leq z < \frac{MF}{RIE_{low} + MF} \\ \left(\frac{TF + CS_{over} TC}{(CS_{over} + GS_{over} z)^2} \right) p_X \left(\frac{(TF + CS_{over} TC)(1-z)}{CS_{over} + GS_{over} z} \right) & \frac{mF}{RIE_{high} + mF} \leq z < \frac{TF}{TP} \\ \frac{mF}{z^2} p_X \left(\left(\frac{1-z}{z} \right) mF \right) & z < \frac{mF}{RIE_{high} + mF} \end{cases}$$

Distribution of ROS – CPIF (Toy Problem)


- Percentiles (20/50/80) and mean are shown on graph
 - Skew right: Mode < Median < Mean



Distribution of ROS (Empirical)

- Without Ts & Cs
- Monte Carlo simulation results agree with analytical results!
 - Even at 100 trials (gray squiggle on graphs), close alignment with true ROS distribution
 - At 10,000 trials (thin black curve), agreement is much more precise
 - May be slight discrepancies in means due to extreme values
 - Limitation of spreadsheet calculations for analytical case

Distribution of ROS – Toy Problem Comparison




Distribution of ROS – Pathological Cases

- Comparison graphs for cases:
 - Base case: As previously shown
 - Aggressive cost: True base cost is \$11.5M instead of \$10.0M
 - Padded cost: True base cost is \$8.5M instead of \$10.0M
 - Understated variability: True standard deviation is \$3.0M instead of \$1.5M
- Summary table across all contract types:


MONTE CARLO

	Base case (\$10M)				Padded cost (\$8.5M)				Aggressive cost (\$11.5M)				Understated variability			
	FFP	FPI	CPIF	CPFF	FFP	FPI	CPIF	CPFF	FFP	FPI	CPIF	CPFF	FFP	FPI	CPIF	CPFF
20th percentile	-2.2%	5.1%	5.2%	8.1%	11.4%	10.5%	10.3%	9.3%	-16.0%	1.3%	2.3%	7.3%	-13.6%	2.0%	2.4%	7.4%
median (50th percentile)	8.9%	9.1%	9.0%	9.1%	22.9%	18.2%	18.2%	10.5%	-4.6%	4.6%	4.6%	8.0%	9.4%	9.1%	9.6%	9.1%
mean	9.0%	11.0%	10.6%	9.3%	22.8%	19.1%	16.6%	10.8%	-4.5%	4.4%	5.8%	8.1%	9.3%	12.5%	12.5%	7.5%
80th percentile	20.3%	16.8%	16.7%	10.2%	34.2%	26.9%	21.6%	12.1%	6.9%	8.4%	8.3%	8.9%	32.0%	25.4%	21.2%	11.9%


FFP – Pathological Cases




FPI – Pathological Cases



CPIF – Pathological Cases



CPFF – Pathological Cases



Aggressive cost and understated variability have similar impact on 20th percentile


- base case
- padded cost
- aggressive cost
- understated variability

Terms and Conditions (Ts & Cs)

- Oftentimes, expected cost growth is simply applied to the fee structure being proposed for the program
 - However, it is important to consider any terms and conditions (Ts & Cs) of the contract that may mitigate cost growth
- Although cost growth may be likely to occur, margin impacts may be mitigated through T&Cs
 - Cost Growth does not always equal Margin Loss
- Examples include:
 - Late delivery of GFE that causes cost and schedule growth
 - Catastrophic Escalation
 - Changes in threat or requirements
- It is sometimes possible to isolate uncertainty and cost growth attributable to these risks and model their margin impacts appropriately

Ts and Cs Impact on the S-Curve


- When you sort by on-the-shareline cost (green bars), off-the-shareline cost (red bars) and total cost are not in order
 - Unless there is perfect correlation
 - Different trials from the Monte Carlo produce the percentiles of interest for different quantities




Distribution of ROS with Ts & Cs

- Monte Carlo simulation example with Ts & Cs
 - Base contract with symmetric cost uncertainty
 - Single risk mitigated off the shareline with no fee
 - Scenario 1 (easier): FFP base with normal risk
 - Scenario 2 (harder): FPI base with triangular risk
- Case 1: independent risks (e.g., escalation completely mitigated)
 - Thumbnail sketch of analytic approach, turns into a 2-variable integral!
 - Pairings of on-shareline and off-shareline costs that produce a given ROS
- Case 2: correlated risks (e.g., escalation partially mitigated)
 - Too hard, and Monte's never busy!
- How to put your point in the cross-hairs
 - Pull 80th percentile Cost and 20th percentile ROS from the Monte Carlo
 - Compute ROS at 80th percentile Cost
 - Add off-shareline cost needed to lower ROS to 20th percentile ROS

Scenario 1: Two S-Curves for Cost




Scenario 1: S-Curve for ROS



Scenario 1: ROS vs. (On-the-Shareline) Cost

Margin % vs. On-the-Shareline Cost



Closing Thoughts

- Presence of mitigating Ts & Cs destroys the one-to-one correspondence of cost and ROS
 - You want the 20th percentile ROS, not the ROS at the 80th percentile of cost!
- We recommend looking at the distribution of ROS
 - Monte Carlo should generally suffice
- As with Earned Value Management (EVM), Contracts would benefit from application of quantitative techniques and data analysis from Cost
 - More thoughtful and appropriate implementation of contract types to the mutual benefit of government and contractor
 - Too many *apparent* "levers" cloud the fact that there are very few *real* levers
- Next steps:
 - Risk-based modeling of Cost and ROS at a portfolio level
 - More thorough development of analytical cases (for "fun")
 - Universal Contract Type! (see coda)

Coda: Universal Contract Type

- Minimal Specifications:
 - Target Cost and Target Profit (Fee) (which together determine Target Price)
 - Optimistic and Pessimistic Costs
 - Shareline in each of four regimes

$$FFP = \left(TC, TF, TC - \xi, TC + \xi, \frac{0}{100}, \frac{0}{100}, \frac{0}{100}, \frac{0}{100} \right)$$

$$FPI = \left(TC, TF, TC - \xi, PTA, \frac{GS_{under}}{CS_{under}}, \frac{GS_{under}}{CS_{under}}, \frac{GS_{over}}{CS_{over}}, \frac{0}{100} \right)$$

$$CPIF = \left(TC, TF, RIE_{low}, RIE_{high}, \frac{100}{0}, \frac{GS_{under}}{CS_{under}}, \frac{GS_{over}}{CS_{over}}, \frac{100}{0} \right)$$

$$CPFF = \left(TC, TF, TC - \xi, TC + \xi, \frac{100}{0}, \frac{100}{0}, \frac{100}{0}, \frac{100}{0} \right)$$

Cadenza: The Proverbial Cocktail Napkin

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$X = \text{Cost}$
 $Y = \text{Price}$
 $Z = \text{ROS} = \frac{Y - X}{X}$

$P(Z \leq r) =$

off
on board