


NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE


Impact of Full Funding on Cost Improvement Rate: A Parametric Assessment

Presented at ICEAA Annual Symposium
Denver, CO
June 2014



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SUPRA ET ULTRA



Full Funding

- + DoD policy for most items funded by procurement appropriations
 - + Air Force, Navy satellite production contracts
 - + Funds for entire delivered end item (eg. Satellite) appropriated in one fiscal year
 - + Some end items on contract remain unfunded until future acts of congress
- + Several exceptions in space business
 - + Many production contracts since 1982 use Multi-Year Procurement: Entire contract funded over several years
 - + Development programs: Typically first two satellites in a new block are incrementally funded
 - + One-of-a-kind/demonstration-type satellites
 - + NASA & NRO Programs

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Cost Improvement

- + Also known as “Production Cost Efficiencies”
- + Decrease in recurring average unit cost when there are higher quantities on a contract
- + Contributors include:
 - + Touch-labor learning effects
 - + Amortization of production set-up costs
 - + Amortization of fixed costs
 - + Quantity discounts on vendor items
 - + Efficient use of staff – work on multiple units

Full funding can preclude some of these contributors & may inhibit cost improvement

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Cost Improvement Rate, r

- + Relative average unit cost (AUC) when quantity on contract doubles
- + Standard “Wright” learning-curve form also used for cost improvement:


$$AUC = T1 \cdot Q^B$$

$$B = \frac{\ln(r)}{\ln(2)}$$

$$r = 2^B$$

Cost-improvement rate, r , is the relative AUC when quantity is doubled


Example for 85% Cost Improvement Rate



Quantity on Contract	Average Unit Cost (Recurring)
1	1.00
2	0.85
3	0.77
4	0.72
5	0.69
6	0.66
7	0.63
8	0.61

- + NRO CAAG estimates cost improvement rate for space hardware boxes during CER development
 - + Quantity is an independent variable in NRO CERs
 - + Each equipment type may have a different result

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Cost Improvement in CERs

Quantity As an Independent Variable (QAIV)

- + QAIV CERs estimate average unit cost (*AUC*) as a function of quantity (*Q*) and other technical variables such as weight (*w*)

Example: $AUC = K \cdot w^A \cdot Q^B$

- + In this example, $Q = 1$ gives a CER that estimates *AUC* of 1 unit

$T1 = K \cdot w^A$


- + This form of the QAIV CER therefore reduces to

$AUC = T1 \cdot Q^B$

- + This is the standard "Wright" learning-curve form
 - + Learning rate (or cost-improvement rate) = 2^B
 - + $2^B =$ Relative *AUC* when *Q* is doubled

Cost-Improvement Rate is Relative Unit Cost When Quantity on Contract Doubles

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


NRO CERs for Recurring Cost

79 Equipment Groups


Att. Control Elex (ACE) Back-End RF Electronics Power Monitors BAPTAs Li batteries NiCd batteries NiH batteries Booster Adapters Command Receivers GPS Digital Comm Front-End RF Electronics Comm LNAs DC Power Harnesses Deployment Drives Driver Control & Data Rounting Elex Earth Sensors EPS Electronics Flight Computers IRUs Accelerometers Large Deployable Reflectors Magnetic Torquers Magnetometers Downlink MW Plumbing TT&C MW Plumbing Horn antenna Spiral antenna	Helix antenna Dipole/Other antenna Nutation Dampers Comm Data Processing Electronics SIG or EO Processing Electronics Positioner assemblies Positioner motors DC power converters AC power converters Power & Coax Harnesses Propulsion Plumbing Pressurant Tanks Propellant Tanks Pyro Driver Electronics RF Coax Harnesses Shunts, Dissipators and Capcitors Feed Equipment Groups Feeds Front End RF Electronics Preamplifiers Small Parabolic Antennas GaAs, deployable arrays GaAs, not deployable arrays Silicon, deployable arrays Silicon, not deployable arrays Solar Array Drives	Solid Rocket Motors Solid-State Transponders Solid-State Transmitters Star Trackers Solar-Array Booms Other Deployable Structure Secondary Structures Trusses and Towers Equipment Compartments Optical Payload structures Analog sun sensors Digital sun sensors Bus and RF Payload thermal H/W EO Payload Thermal H/W Thermal Blankets Thermal Heaters and Sensors Thermal Heat Pipes & Radiators Thermal Shields/Barriers/Louvers Thrusters Oscillators Timers/Clocks TT&C Digital Electronics TWTAs Waveguide Assemblies Reaction Wheels CMGs
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Histogram: Cost-Improvement Rate in NRO CERs



Cost-Improvement Rate Range	Number of Types of Components
68-72%	3
72-76%	1
76-80%	2
80-84%	5
84-88%	9
88-92%	6
92-96%	1
96-100%	5

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



USCM Dataset: Funding Policies

CONTRACT	Full Funded?	Basis/Comment	CONTRACT	Full Funded?	Basis/Comment
ACTS	No	NASA	Landsat 7	No	NASA
AE	No	NASA	LCROSS	No	NASA
AEPH 1-3	No	F3 added 4 years into contract.	Mightysat II	No	Demo/RDT&E
AQUA/AURA	No	NASA	Milstar I LDR Payload	No	RDT&E funded.
AXAF	No	NASA	Milstar II Crosslink Payload	No	12/31/94 SAR has all MILSTAR RDT&E funded
Coriolis	No	Demo	Milstar II LDR Payload Flight 4	No	12/31/94 SAR has all MILSTAR RDT&E funded
CRRES	No	Demo	Milstar II LDR Payload Flight 5 & 6	No	12/31/94 SAR has all MILSTAR RDT&E funded
DMSP 5D1 (1-4)	Yes	Contract 72-C-0221 had development and production.	Milstar II MDR Payload	No	12/31/94 SAR has all MILSTAR RDT&E funded
DMSP 5D2 (8-10)	Yes	Prior to 1982 DoD Auth Act MYP not used for major acquisitions. (5d2-improved S11-14 were MYP in 1983.)	OSO	No	Demo/RDT&E
DMSP 5D3 (16-20)	No	MYP per 12/31/90 SAR.	P72-2	No	Demo/RDT&E
DSCS IIIA (1&2)	No	RD&E funded.	P78-1	No	Demo/RDT&E
DSCS IIIB (4-7)	Yes	B4/5 were approved in 1982, and B6/7 in 1983.	P78-2	No	Demo/RDT&E
DSCS IIIB (8-14)	No	MYP per 12/31/84 SAR	Program 1	No	commercial
DSP 14-17	Yes	Prior to 1982 DoD Auth Act MYP not used for major acquisitions.	Program 2	No	commercial
DSP 18-22	No	MYP per 12/31/87 SAR	Program 3	No	commercial
FLTSAT 1-5	Yes	GAO LCD-79-108 describes a development contract (design and qual model) plus two production contracts, which would have been full funded.	Program 4	No	commercial
FLTSAT 6-8	Yes	No mention of MYP in any document describing this acquisition. Long lead was awarded before the 1982 law changes. Overall very disjointed production program.	Program 5	No	commercial
Galileo	No	NASA	Program 6	No	commercial
GeoLITE	No	NRO	Program 7	No	commercial
GOES I-M	No	NASA	Program 8	No	commercial
GPS III/A (13-40)	No	MYP per 12/31/85 SAR	Program 9	No	commercial
GPS (1-8)	No	RDT&E funded.	Radsat I	No	Commercial
GPS (9-11)	No	RDT&E funded.	RHESI	No	Demo/RDT&E
GPS IIR (41-61)	No	MYP per 12/31/88 SAR	S3	No	Demo/RDT&E
GRO	No	NASA	SIRTF Bus	No	NASA
IKONOS	No	Commercial	SMS	No	NASA
			Spaceway	No	Commercial
			SSM	No	NASA
			Thuraya (1-2)	No	Commercial
			Topex	No	NASA
			UFO (1-10)	No	MYP per 12/31/93 SAR.
			WGS (1-3)	Yes	Interview w/ Boeing PM 2008. Parts bought for 1 sat at a time.

NRO CERs include these contracts – We can evaluate differences

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Analysis Process

Hypothesis: If full funding contracts truly have a higher (flatter) cost improvement rate, then:

- + Residual errors will exhibit an upward trend vs. production quantity
- + That trend will take an exponential form


$$AUC_i = X \cdot Q_i^B \cdot (1 + \%error_i)$$

↑
Residual error for data-point *i*


Evaluation Steps:

1. Collect all residuals from existing NRO recurring-cost CERs
2. Identify data points as coming from a fully funded contract or not
3. Assess trends in residuals vs. quantity on contract by regression of residuals
 - All data
 - Full-funded points only
4. Test for significance (in LOLS case)

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


All Data



Average cost improvement rate of 85% is resulting in balanced error for quantities of 1 to 100 boxes per contract.

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Regression on % Error (Residuals)

- + % Error = $x \cdot Q^{\Delta B}$
- + ΔB = difference in quantity exponent from the CER average

	ΔB	$2^{\Delta B}$	Difference in CIC Rate
ZMPE	$\Delta B_{ZMPE} = -0.15$	$2^{-0.15} = 90\%$	-10% difference
LOLS	$\Delta B_{LOLS} = -0.02$	$2^{-0.02} = 98.6\%$	-1.4% difference

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Significance Test

- + In a test for significance of a LOLS regression
 - + $\text{Log}(\% \text{Error} + 1) = \text{log}(B) + C * \text{log}(BPC)$


	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.87
Residual	118	13.04	0.11		
Total	119	13.04			

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.015
R Square	0.000
Adjusted R Square	-0.008
Standard Error	0.332
Observations	120

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	Upper 95.0%
Intercept	-0.10	0.09	-1.10	0.27	-0.29	0.08	-0.29	0.08
log(BPC)	-0.02	0.12	-0.16	0.87	-0.27	0.23	-0.27	0.23

- + The null hypothesis in this regression test is that the true slope equals zero
- + P-value of 0.87 is high, indicating we cannot reject the hypothesis that the trend is flat

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Summary

- + We cannot conclude that fully funded contracts have a higher cost improvement rate.
- + Most programs in USCM database are not full funded.
- + Cost efficiencies due to Multiyear Procurement or Incremental Funding are not evident at unit-level.

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